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References to Historical Figures as  
a Means of Persuasion in Ancient Rhetoric.  
A Research Methodology Applicable to Cicero
Abstract: A speaker in republican Rome had a vast repertoire of arguments based on the past at his 
disposal. Although the ways in which they were employed differed considerably, both the ancients 
and modern scholars, with few exceptions, have tended to classify all of them as ‘historical exempla’. 
In the present paper, a distinction is made between the references to historical figures as a means of 
persuasion and the exempla in a broader sense. Additionally, a research methodology applicable to 
the study of the exemplum sensu stricto in Cicero’s orations is suggested.
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The Exemplary Discourse
Ancient speakers and authors often refer to individuals or events from the remote or recent past for various purposes. They aim at moral guidance, 
self ‑fashioning, ornamentation, promotion of certain ideas, but above all at con‑
vincing the recipient to either act as expected or perceive given facts in a spe‑
cific, mostly tendentious way. This practice has usually been defined in modern 
scholarship as exemplary discourse1. Its scope is very wide, ranging from simple 
1 For this useful notion see M.B. Rol le r: “Exemplarity in Roman Culture: The Cases of Hora‑




references to famous ancestors’ deeds and sayings, such as collected by Valerius 
Maximus, to a more complex exploitation of urban architectural space (public 
monuments, statues, tombs). Special opportunity to commemorate the ancestors’ 
achievements and virtues came during the funeral processions, when masks of the 
deceased (imagines) were carried2. Previous judgements in courts were also held 
up as exemplary events. Rhetorical arguments based on them are commonly de‑
scribed by scholars as ‘legal precedents’3. In other words, everything the Romans 
would conceive as belonging to the mos maiorum might have constituted part of 
this discourse.
For the Romans, their history to a large degree consisted of a series of exem‑
plary deeds which ought to be imitated so that the republic might survive and those 
to be avoided so that it would not come to any harm. Through various conduits, the 
young Roman was raised in the midst of these models, especially if born to one of 
the major aristocratic families. Ever since records of what had happened in the past 
started being kept, the nobiles watched carefully which events and ancestors were 
fit to become part of the tradition to serve as an object of imitation for future gener‑
ations4. In a sense, then, the elites were responsible for both creating and preserving 
ment from the Past in Cicero’s Orations. Theory and Practice funded by the Polish National Science 
Center (no. 2016/23/D/HS2/02408). I would like to thank the anonymous referees of Scripta Classica 
for their valuable comments and The Lanckoroński Foundation for granting me a scholarship during 
which I had the opportunity to improve my paper in the libraries of Rome in March, 2018.
2 The locus classicus is Plb. 6, 53–55 on which see F.W. Walban k: A Historical Commen‑
tary on Polybius. Vol. I. Oxford 1957, ad loc. (pp. 737–740). Cf. E .  F la ig: “Die pompa funebris. 
Adlige Konkurrenz und annalistische Erinnerung in der römischen Republik.” In: Memoria als 
Kultur. Hrsg. O.G. Oex le. Göttingen 1995, pp. 115–148; M.B. Rol le r: “Exemplarity in Roman 
Culture…,” pp. 1 f and passim. The standard work is H. F lower: Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic 
Power in Roman Culture. Oxford 1996 (esp. ch. 4: “Ancestors at the Funeral: The Pompa Funebris” 
[pp. 91–127]).
3 On legal precedents see J. Ha r r ie s: Cicero and the Jurists: from Citizen’s Law to the Lawful 
State. London 2006, pp. 134–141, on their use in the Pro Balbo, for instance, see Eadem: “Cicero 
and the Law.” In: Cicero the Advocate. Eds. J. Powel l, J. Pate r son. New York 2004, pp. 158–163. 
Cicero reminds the jury in his Verrine speeches not to pass judgment favorable to the defendant, lest 
they set a perilous legal precedent (e.g. 2, 1, 20: “ut primo die testium tanto numero citato populus 
Romanus iudicaret i s to  absoluto rem publ icam s t a re  non posse” 3, 219). Here undoubt‑
edly belongs the famous causa Curiana when, according to Cicero, L. Licinius Crassus must have 
resorted to a great number of exempla to defeat Q. Mucius Scaevola (Cic. Brut. 144 = 2ORF, p. 246 
[Crassus] = p. 261 [Scaevola]: “ita enim multa tum contra scriptum pro aequo et bono dixit, ut 
hominem acutissimum Q. Scaevolam et in iure, in quo illa causa vertebatur, paratissimum obrueret 
a rg u mentor u m exemplor u mque copia  […]”). See on the subject e.g. M.C. A lexander: Tri‑
als in the Late Roman Republic, 149 BC to 50 BC. Toronto–Buffalo–London 1990, pp. 48 f; E. Fan ‑
t ham: The Roman World of Cicero’s De oratore. Oxford 2004, p. 119. Cf. in general R.L. Enos: The 
Literate Mode of Cicero’s Legal Rhetoric. Carbondale–Edwardsville 1988.
4 See H. Rech: Mos maiorum. Wesen und Wirkung der Tradition in Rom. (Diss.) Marburg 
1936; H. Drex le r: “Die moralische Geschichtsauffassung der Römer”. Gymnasium 61 (1954), 
pp. 171 f = Das Staatsdenken der Römer. Hrsg. R. K le i n. Darmstadt 1973, pp. 260 ff, who quotes 
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the most suitable exempla5. All the above mentioned media for narrating the past, to 
which one may add public and pontifical archives, were controlled by the nobility. 
Though a homo novus, however, Cicero has managed to claim some of the Roman 
forebears as his own personal exempla, and to redefine the actions of others in line 
with his own political agenda. By doing so, he was able to build his own public 
persona and promote himself as an excellent orator and an able statesman6. As such, 
neither his strategy of self ‑fashioning nor the general references to the broadly per‑
ceived mos maiorum serve as historical exempla sensu stricto, in that their primary 
concern is with the future and they seldom contribute to the immediate rhetorical 
effect. In the case of Cicero, it is the statesman, as it were, and not the orator who 
employs them. They are introduced into a speech, a treatise or even a letter in order 
to encourage a person, a group of people, or the society at large to act in a specific 
way or to look at certain things in accordance with the author’s wishes. 
It is the purpose of the present paper to distinguish references to historical 
figures as a means of persuasion from the broadly conceived exempla. Secondly, 
I argue that not all such references to the past should be called historical exempla 
out of hand, as there are other rhetorical figures, better suited to describe some 
of them, particularly the antonomasia. My main objective, finally, is to establish 
a research methodology applicable to the study of this particular kind of argument 
from the past in Cicero’s orations. The nature of the exemplum as such viewed 
from the perspective of both the ancient rhetoricians and modern scholarship is 
obvious and necessary point of departure. 
Exemplum in Its Broader Sense
A close affinity between exemplum and simile was underscored by the author 
of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, whose definition (4, 62: “Exemplum est alicuius 
facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio. Id  sumitur  isdem 
Cato, orig. fr. 83 Pete r  = Gell. 3, 7 as one such example; K. Ch r is t: Krise und Untergang der 
römischen Republik. Darmstadt 42000, p. 415; F. Pina Polo: “Die nützliche Erinnerung: Geschichts‑
schreibung, mos maiorum und die römische Identität”. Historia 53, 2 (2004), pp. 156 f, 159. On the 
mos maiorum in general see recently the collection of papers in: Mos maiorum. Untersuchungen zu 
den Formen der Identitätsstiftung und Stabilisierung in der römischen Republik. Hrsgg. B. Li n ke, 
H. Stem mler. Stuttgart 2000. 
5 Cf. K. ‑J. Höl keskamp: “Exempla und mos maiorum. Überlegungen zum kollektiven 
Gedächtnis der Nobilität.” In: Vergangenheit und Lebenswelt. Soziale Kommunikation, Traditions‑
bildung und historisches Bewußtsein. Hrsgg. H. ‑J. Geh rke, A. Möl le r. Tübingen 1996, p. 316.
6 See H. van de r  Blom: Cicero’s Role Models. The Political Strategy of a Newcomer. New 
York 2010. Cf. F. P i na Polo: “Die nützliche Erinnerung…,” p. 165. On Cicero’s use of the mos 
maiorum see now J. Kent y: “Congenital Virtue: Mos Maiorum in Cicero’s Orations”. CJ 111, 




de causis  quibus s imil i tudo”) has influenced some scholars7. The way Cice‑
ro himself put it is preferable in that he mentions casus alicuius hominis instead of 
factum aut dictum, which makes it possible to take into account historical persons 
who were the objects of an action, and not necessarily its agents.8 For him too it 
counts among the more general conparabilia, to which apart from the exemplum 
belong imago and conlatio (=similitudo). The modern standard definition, so to 
say, of the narrowly conceived exemplum is usually based on that of Quintilian 
(Inst. 5, 11, 6): “quod proprie  vocamus exemplum, id est rei gestae aut ut ges‑
tae utilis ad persuadendum id, quod intenderis, commemoratio”, followed e.g. by 
H. Lausberg9.
The modern researchers concerned with the exemplum tend to agree on its 
relying on past events, people, or actions, but they differ at specifying its function, 
depending on the literary genre they are investigating10. The ancients themselves 
provide us with various responses to the issue in question11. To put it briefly, the 
 7 A.D. Leeman (Orationis ratio. The Stylistic Theories and Practice of the Roman Orators, 
Historians, and Philosophers. Amsterdam 1963, p. 40) simply translates this passage in his hand‑
book: “The third figure of this triad is exemplum (παράδειγμα), in which something said or done in 
the past is cited with the name of its auctor. […] The aim of the exemplum is the same as that of the 
comparison”. Cf. the definition of Zeno the Stoic (SVF 1, 84 von A r n im = Rhet. Gr. 1, 447 Spen‑
gel): παράδειγμά ἐστι γενομένου πράγματος ἀπομνημόνευσις εἰς ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ νῦν ζητουμένου.
 8 See Cic. Inv. 1, 49: “conparabile autem est, quod in rebus diversis similem aliquam rationem 
continet. eius partes sunt tres: imago, conlatio, exemplum. […] exemplu m es t, quod rem auc ‑
tor i t a t e  aut  casu a l icu ius  homi n is  aut  negot i i  con f i r mat  aut  i n f i r mat”. Cf. the ex‑
ample of Quintilian (Inst. 5, 11, 6 fin.): “iure occisus est Saturninus sicut Gracchi” which juxtaposes 
persons who were both justly killed. See also Cicero’s De Provinciis Consularibus Oratio. Ed. 
L. G r i l lo. Oxford 2015, ad § 26 (p. 175).
 9 See H. Lausberg: Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literatur‑
wissenschaft. Stuttgart 31990, § 410 (pp. 227 f). On the notion of res gesta aut ut gesta cf. B.J. P r ice: 
Paradeigma and exemplum in Ancient Rhetorical Theory. (Diss.) Univ. of California, Berkeley 1975, 
p. 149. On the exemplum in ancient rhetorical theory in general see ibid., passim; K. A lewel l: 
Über das rhetorische ΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΓΜΑ. Theorie, Beispielsammlungen, Verwendung in der Kaiserzeit. 
(Diss. Kiel) Leipzig 1912, which is still useful, and more recently K. Demoen: “A Paradigm for 
the Analysis of Paradigms: The Rhetorical Exemplum in Ancient and Imperial Greek Theory”. Rhe‑
torica 15 (1997), pp. 125–158. See also D.L. Cla rk: Rhetoric in Greco ‑Roman Education. New 
York 1959, p. 124. On the meaning of Quintilian’s phrase id quod intenderis see the discussion in 
the section “The Adjustment of the Paradigm Theory” below.
10 Thus, for instance, for A.W. Robi nson: Cicero’s Use of People as exempla in His Speeches. 
(Diss.) Univ. of Indiana 1986, p. 1 it is “to make an argument more persuasive”, for I. O pper man n: 
Zur Funktion historischer Beispiele in Ciceros Briefen. Leipzig 2000, p. 19 exempla are simply “die 
Erwähnung von realen oder als realen betrachteten Personen oder Ereignissen […], die […] von 
außen neben das Thema gestellt sind […]”, for H. van de r  Blom: Cicero’s Role Models…, p. 3 an 
exemplum “is intended to serve as a moral ‑didactic guide to conduct”. The state of modern research 
of exemplum is discussed e.g. by F. Bücher: Verargumentierte Geschichte. Exempla Romana im 
politischen Diskurs der späten römischen Republik. Stuttgart 2006, p. 152, n. 1.
11 See, e.g., Rhet. Her. 4, 62: “Rem or nat iorem faci t  cum nullius rei nisi dignitatis causa 
sumitur; ape r t iorem, cum id quod sit obscurius magis dilucidum reddit; p robabi l iorem, cum 
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exemplum can serve either as a means of persuasion, as ornamentation, as illus‑
tration of an argument or, finally, as a role model. Some of the precepts we come 
across in the ancient handbooks, on the other hand, may turn out to suit poetry 
better12, especially as the exemplum is often dealt with under the rubric ‘figures of 
thought’13. One should not be easily misled by the titles of those works, for a good 
deal of material gathered in the Rhetorica ad Herennium will be illustrated on the 
example of republican tragedy, and Vergil, apart from Cicero, is arguably author 
the most often quoted by Quintilian. 
It seems reasonable to assume, moreover, that the persuasive function had been 
gradually in decline since rhetoric lost its judicial and political meaning in Rome 
during the Principate14. For Livy, the exemplum will serve mainly as a moral guide 
for the characters of the Ab urbe condita “within the text”15. From the Early Em‑
pire onwards, as the work of Valerius Maximus clearly indicates, exempla were 
magis veri similem facit; ante  ocu los  pon it, cum exprimit omnia perspicue ut res prope dicam 
manu temptari possit”; 2, 46: “quoniam exornatio constat ex similibus et exemplis et amplifica‑
tionibus et rebus iudicatis et ceteris rebus […]” and the discussion of other sources in J. Mar t i n: 
Antike Rhetorik. Technik und Methode. München 1974, pp. 119 ff; K. Demoen: “A Paradigm for the 
Analysis of Paradigms…”, pp. 130–133.
12 On exempla in poetry see R. Öh le r: Mythologische Exempla in der älteren griechischen 
Dichtung. (Diss.) Basel 1925; H.V. Cante r: “The Mythological Paradigm in Greek and Latin Po‑
etry”. AJPh 54 (1933), pp. 201–224; M.M. Wi l lcock: “Mythological Paradeigma in the Iliad”. CQ, 
NS 14, 2 (1964), pp. 141–154; A. Bobrowsk i: Mitologia w rzymskiej elegii i liryce miłosnej okresu 
augustowskiego. Kraków 1997; M. Puk: Mitologia w wygnańczych utworach Owidiusza. Poznań 
2013.
13 E.g. Rhet. Her. 4, 62 quoted in n. 11 above; Cic. De or. 3, 205; Top. 41–45. Cf. M.H. Mc‑
Cal l, Jr.: Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison. Cambridge (Mass.) 1969, p. 100; 
J. Wisse, M. Wi nte rbot tom, E. Fantham: M. Tullius Cicero. De oratore libri III. Vol. 5. A Com‑
mentary on Book III, 96–230. Heidelberg 2008, p. 318. 
14 Cf. P. Pan it schek: “Sp. Cassius, Sp. Maelius, M. Manlius als exempla maiorum”. Philo‑
logus 133, 2 (1989), pp. 231–245 [here at 232]: “Exempla treten, wie die Quellen zeigen, nach der 
Institutionalisierung des Prinzipats nur noch als moralisch ‑ethische Lehrbeispiele, nicht aber als 
Argumente in einem politischen Disput über Sachfragen auf […]”. Among the most relevant ancient 
sources are Tac. Dial. 1, 1 and passim; Petr. 1 f, 88; Vell. 1, 16–18; Sen. Contr. 1, praef. 6–8; cf. 
H. Caplan: “The Decay of Eloquence at Rome in the First Century.” In: Studies in Speech and 
Drama in Honor of Alexander M. Drummond. Ed. H.A. Wichel ns. Ithaca 1944, pp. 295–325 = Of 
Eloquence. Studies in Ancient and Mediaeval Rhetoric by Harry Caplan. Eds. A. K i ng, H. Nor th. 
Ithaca–London 1970, pp. 160–195. The standard work on the subject seems to be still K. Held man n: 
Antike Theorien über Entwicklung und Verfall der Redekunst. München 1982 (see esp. pp. 207–299). 
Already Cicero, as Tacitus. Dialogus de oratoribus. Ed. R. Mayer. Cambridge 2001, p. 12, n. 34 
notes, had prophesized about this decline (Tusc. 2, 5). Quintilian later wrote a piece entitled De cau‑
sis corruptae eloquentiae, of which only fragments survive (C.O. Br i n k: “Quintilian’s De Causis 
Corruptae Eloquentiae and Tacitus’ Dialogus de Oratoribus”. CQ 39, 2 (1989), pp. 472–503).
15 See N. Zorze t t i: “Struttura annalistica e sistema degli exempla nelle storie liviane”. In: 
Idem: Interpretazioni latine. Padua 1978, pp. 79–127; J.D. Chapl i n: Livy’s Exemplary History. 
New York 2000, p. 3. A short bibliographical survey is given by H. van de r  Blom: Cicero’s Role 




increasingly becoming subordinate to the imperial policy. Their function outside 
of the text was limited to moral lessons, but collections of the facta et dicta were 
also meant to supply a reader with an appropriate means of illustrating a case16. 
This eventually led to the development of a new literary genre in the Middle Ages, 
namely the exempla as ‘parables’ or ‘anecdotes’17. 
By this short sketch I intended to call attention to the fact that the exemplum, 
both diachronically and in terms of its purpose, has been a very complex phenom‑
enon, encompassing numerous meanings. Even in its narrower sense of rhetori‑
cal example, it could have two significations, one more general, the other more 
technical. The former, closely associated with ancestral custom (mos maiorum), 
stemmed from the practice of following in the footsteps of one’s predecessors. At 
Rome, it rested upon the high respect everything related to the ancestors enjoyed18. 
On a more universal level, the ancients saw the advantages of perceiving of and 
deciding about the future in the light of past events19. That is precisely why the 
rhetoricians commonly ascribed it to the genus deliberativum20. 
The latter is what Cicero listed among the conparabilia (cf. n. 8), and what 
Quintilian understood by the Greek παράδειγμα (Inst. 5, 11, 1): “quo nomine et 
generaliter usi sunt [scil. Graeci] in omni similium adpositione et specialiter in 
iis, quae rerum gestarum auctor i ta te  ni tuntur ”, that is the comparing of 
16 For a more detailed discussion see U. Luca rel l i: Exemplarische Vergangenheit. Valerius 
Maximus und die Konstruktion des sozialen Raumes in der frühen Kaiserzeit. Göttingen 2007, 
pp. 24–35; cf. G. Maslakov: “Valerius Maximus and Roman Historiography. A Study of the exem‑
pla Tradition”. ANRW II 32, 1 (1984), pp. 437–496.
17 See P. von Moos: Geschichte als Topik. Das Rhetorische Exemplum von der Antike zur 
Neuzeit und die historiae im Policraticus des Johann von Salisbury. Hildesheim–New York 1986; 
Idem: “Das argumentative Exemplum und die ‘wächserne Nase’ der Autorität im Mittelalter.” In: 
Exemplum et Similitudo. Alexander the Great and other heroes as points of reference in medieval 
literature. Eds. W.J. Aer t s, M. Gosman. Groningen 1988, p. 55 and other essays collected in this 
volume; T. Szos tek: Exemplum w polskim średniowieczu. Warszawa 1997; E.R. Cu r t iu s: Litera‑
tura europejska i łacińskie średniowiecze. Trans. A. Borowsk i. Kraków 1997, pp. 65–67.
18 See Cic. De or. 1, 18: “tenenda praeterea est om n is  ant iqu it a s  exemplor u mque v is, 
neque legum ac iuris civilis scientia neglegenda est”. Cf. A.D. Leeman, H. P i n ks te r: M. Tullius 
Cicero. De oratore libri III. Kommentar. Bd. 1. Buch I, 1–165. Heidelberg 1981, pp. 40 f; H. van de r 
Blom: Cicero’s Role Models…, passim and J. Kenty: “Congenital Virtue…”, passim.
19 See Arist. Rh. 1418a: ἔστιν δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα δημηγορικώτατα, τὰ δ’ ἐνθυμήματα 
δικανικώτερα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ  τὸ μ έλ λ ον, ὥσ τ’ ἐ κ τῶν γε νομ έ νων ἀ νάγ κ η παραδε ίγματα 
λ έ γε ιν, ἡ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἢ μὴ ὄντων, οὗ μᾶλλον ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ τὸ 
γεγονὸς ἀνάγκην; Lys. 25, 23: χρὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοῖ ς  πρότερον γε γε ν ημ έ νοι ς 
παραγε ίγμασ ι  χρωμένους βουλ ε ύεσθαι  περὶ  τῶν μ ελ λ όν των ἔσεσθαι.
20 See Arist. loc. cit.; Rhet. Her. 3, 4: “aut si suadebimus quippiam cuius rei gestae aut prae‑
sentem aut auditam memoriam poterimus habere – qua in re facile id quod velimus exemplo al‑
lato persuadere possumus”; Quint. Inst. 5, 11, 9: “ad exhortationem vero praecipue valent imparia”. 
Quintilian has here only the exemplum impar in mind, but he does not recommend other types for 
any specific kind of oratory.
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matters similar to one another, especially those based on history. In this respect, 
I believe, the rhetorical procedure whereby an orator introduces an individual or an 
action from the past in order to improve his argument did not change, at least from 
theoretical point of view, since it was expounded for the first time by Aristotle. In 
Rh. 1393a he divides the exempla into historical ones (τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγε‑
γενημένα) and those which have been made up (τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν). These latter are 
in turn specified as either similitudo (παραβολή), or fables (λόγοι, οἷον Αἰσώπειοι 
καὶ Λιβυκοί).21 Quintilian, after discussing the degrees of similarity between vari‑
ous types of exempla, makes the same distinction. First, he mentions poeticae 
fabulae and fabellae (5, 11, 17–20), and then he rounds off the survey of exempla 
by saying (§ 22): “Proximas exemplo vires habet s imil i tudo […]”. Furthermore, 
when he calls attention to their use in the deliberations upon the future actions, 
he chooses the Aristotelian example concerning Dionysius’ aiming at tyranny.22 
Similar argumentation might have been used at Rome as early as the latter half of 
the second century bc, when ‘C. Fannius’ (cos. 122) argued against C. Gracchus’ 
munificence (the grant of citizenship to the Latins and Latin rights to the Italians?). 
He compared his opponent to Dionysius, Pisistratus, and Phalaris (Iul. Victor 11 
[RLM, p. 413 Halm] = 2ORF, pp. 144 f Malcovati): “non debetis largitionem per‑
mittere; nam et Dionysius et Pisistratus cives largitione corruperunt (fr. 6) […]; si 
Phalaridi et Pisistrato et ceteris omnibus una res maxime, largitio, dominationem 
comparavit, quid est, quod non idem Gracchum adfectare credatis, quem eadem 
quae illos facere videatis? (fr. 7)”23. This would to some extent account for the rela‑
21 Cf. F. Sol msen: “Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric”. AJPh 62 (1941), p. 171 = 
Rhetorika. Schriften zur aristotelischen und hellenistischen Rhetorik. Hrsg. R. St a rk. Hildesheim 
1968, p. 330; [Cicero] Ad C. Herennium De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium). Ed. H. Ca‑
plan. London–Cambridge (Mass.) 1968, p. 376, n.b. 
22 See Quint. Inst. 5, 11, 8: “etiam in iis, quae futura dicemus, utilis similium admonitio est, ut 
si quis dicens, Dionysium idcirco petere custodes salutis suae, ut eorum adiutus armis tyrannidem 
occupet, hoc referat exemplum, eadem ratione Pisistratum ad dominationem pervenisse” ~ Arist. 
Rh. 1357b: οἷον ὅτι ἐπεβούλευε τυραννίδι Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακήν· καὶ γὰρ Πεισίστρατος 
πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ᾔτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβὼν ἐτυράννησε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις· καὶ 
ἄ λ λ οι  ὅσους ἴσασ ι, παράδε ιγμα πά ν τες  γ ίγ νον ται  τοῦ Διον υσ ίου, ὃν οὐκ ἴσασίν πω εἰ 
διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι φυλακὴν αἰτεῖ. 
Cf. D.L. Cla rk: Rhetoric in Greco ‑Roman Education…, p. 125. 
23 Cf. on the subject A.W. Robi nson: Cicero’s Use of People as exempla…, pp. 10 f, 16 with 
n. 21. For the historical background see the sources listed by T.R.S. Broughton: The Magistrates 
of the Roman Republic. Vol. I. New York 1951, p. 516 (henceforth MRR) and the discussion below. 
Though these fragments are considered by E. Malcovat i as incertae sedis, they might have fitted 
the context of C. Fannius’ speech De sociis et nomine Latino. Cf. R. Mors te i n  ‑Mar x: Mass Ora‑
tory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic. Cambridge 2004, pp. 127; 222, n. 82. Contra 
[implicite] D. Stock ton: The Gracchi. Oxford 1979, pp. 156 f. J. ‑L. Fe r ra r y (“A propos de deux 
fragments attribués a C. Fannius, cos. 122 [ORF4, fr. 6 et 7]”. In: Demokratia et aristokratia. A pro‑
pos de Caius Gracchus: mots grecs et réalités romaines. Éd. C. Nicole t. Paris 1983, pp. 51–58), 
however, argues convincingly against the attribution of these fragments to C. Fannius. According 




tive conciseness with which the Roman handbooks of rhetoric known to us deal 
with the exemplum as a means of persuasion. Perhaps fuller elaborations upon the 
subject existed and such authors as Cicero, who was never too fond of the tech‑
nicalities24, did not feel obliged to say what seemed obvious. Looked at this way, 
however, in order to grasp what underlies the narrowly conceived exemplum, one 
has to resort to the “original treatment” of it.
The Aristotelian Paradigm
Aristotle describes the paradigm as a mode of arguing from similar to similar 
or, in other words, from particular to particular25. It rests, therefore, on the ana‑
logy between a part of the event referred to during a speech and a part of that 
which constitutes the case under discussion. Both of them should belong to the 
same γένος – ‘general class’26. An example is the abovementioned lust for power 
of Dionysius of Syracuse (quoted in n. 22 above)27. Aristotle does not delve into 
details of the mechanism of the analogy, for he has already explained it on another 
occasion, in his Prior Analytics28. Only through the understanding of that passage, 
argument, we shall call Gracchus’ adversary ‘C. Fannius’, since a hypothetical declaimer might as 
well have impersonated him.
24 See, e.g., E. Na rducci: Cicerone e l’eloquenza romana. Retorica e progetto culturale. 
Roma–Bari 1997, pp. 24–28; J. Wisse, M. Wi nte rbot tom, E. Fantham: M. Tullius Cicero. De 
oratore libri III…, pp. 303 f.
25 See Arist. Rh. 1357b: ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὔθ’ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος οὔθ’ ὡς ὅλον 
πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον–ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ᾖ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, 
γνωριμώτερον δὲ θάτερον ᾖ θατέρου, παράδειγμά ἐστιν·. Cf. Rhet. Her. 4, 61 fin.: “Non enim res 
tota totae rei necesse est similis sit, sed id ipsum quod conferetur similitudinem habeat oportet”.
26 Cf. W.M.A. G r imald i: Aristotle, Rhetoric I. A Commentary. New York 1980, ad 1357b27 
(p. 69); S. Schwei n f u r th  ‑Wal la: Studien zu den rhetorischen Überzeugungzmitteln bei Cicero 
und Aristoteles. Tübingen 1986, p. 54; K. Demoen: “A Paradigm for the Analysis of Paradigms…,” 
pp. 133 f; Aristoteles. Rhetorik. Hrsg. C. Rapp. Zweiter Halbband, Berlin 2002, ad 1357b25–1358a2 
(p. 208). The other type, alongside the analogical, is the inductive paradigm, where “the exam‑
ple is quoted as an illustration of a general rule” (K. Demoen: “A Paradigm for the Analysis of 
Paradigms…,” p. 134). This type, however, does not seem to be relevant to Cicero’s practice of 
referring to historical figures. A somewhat different understanding of Aristotle’s double meaning 
of παράδειγμα was offered by A. Kantel ha rdt: De Aristotelis rhetoricis. (Diss.) Göttingen 1911 = 
Rhetorika… . Hrsg. R. St a rk, pp. 124–183 [here at 159–163].
27 Cf. for instance Pl. R. 566b: Τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ἐπὶ τούτῳ πάντες 
οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς 
αὐτοῖς ᾖ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός. 
28 See Arist. APr. 68b–69a: Παράδειγμα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅταν τῷ μέσῳ τὸ ἄκρον ὑπάρχον δειχθῇ διὰ 
τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ τρίτῳ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέσον τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνώριμον εἶναι ὑπάρχον. 
οἷον ἔστω τὸ Α κακόν, τὸ δὲ Β πρὸς ὁμόρους ἀναιρεῖσθαι πόλεμον, ἐφ’ ᾧ δὲ Γ τὸ Ἀθηναίους 
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as S. Schweinfurth ‑Walla suggests, are we able to draw conclusions on the nature 
of the device at large.29
What Aristotle had employed here was described by later formal logic as ‘the 
Barbara ‑1 syllogism’: If A is predicated of all B, and B is predicated of all C, then 
A is predicated of all C30. The argument, in short, runs as follows: we know that 
the war between the Thebans and the Phocians was an evil; this war was waged 
against neighbors; it leads to a general premise that to fight against neighbors is 
an evil; therefore, a war of the Athenians against the Thebans would be something 
evil (since they are neighbors)31. S. Schweinfurth ‑Walla has built the following 
pattern32 on that basis: 1) Δ = A (it is a fact that the war between the Thebans and 
the Phocians was a disaster) and 2) Δ = B is reached by induction (because it was 
a war against neighbors). 3) All B equal A, and further 4) Γ = B (the Athenians 
versus the Thebans means fighting against neighbors) which inevitably leads to 
5) Γ = A. In order to get a proper paradigm, therefore, we need first to replace the 
variables with particulars (e.g. ‘a thing is evil’ instead of simply A) and next supply
πρὸς Θηβαίους, τὸ δ’ ἐφ’ ᾧ Δ Θηβαίους πρὸς Φωκεῖς. ἐὰν οὖν βουλώμεθα δεῖξαι ὅτι τὸ Θηβαίοις 
πολεμεῖν κακόν ἐστι, ληπτέον ὅτι τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους πολεμεῖν κακόν. τούτου δὲ πίστις ἐκ 
τῶν ὁμοίων, οἷον ὅτι Θηβαίοις ὁ πρὸς Φωκεῖς. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους κακόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς 
Θηβαίους πρὸς ὁμόρους ἐστί, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ πρὸς Θηβαίους πολεμεῖν κακόν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ Β τῷ 
Γ καὶ τῷ Δ ὑπάρχει, φανερόν (ἄμφω γάρ ἐστι  πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους ἀναιρεῖσθαι πόλεμον), καὶ ὅτι τὸ 
Α τῷ Δ (Θηβαίοις γὰρ οὐ συνήνεγκεν ὁ πρὸς Φωκεῖς πόλεμος)· ὅτι δὲ τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχει, διὰ τοῦ 
Δ δειχθήσεται. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κἂν εἰ διὰ πλειόνων τῶν ὁμοίων ἡ πίστις γένοιτο τοῦ μέσου 
πρὸς τὸ ἄκρον. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ παράδειγμά ἐστιν οὔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὔτε ὡς ὅλον πρὸς 
μέρος, ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ᾖ ὑπὸ ταὐτό, γνώριμον δὲ θάτερον.
29 See S. Schwei n f u r th  ‑Wal la: Studien zu den rhetorischen Überzeugungzmitteln…, p. 58: 
“Erst die Analyse von An.pr. 68b38–69a19 ermöglicht das Verständnis von Rhet. 1357b25–36” who 
in support of this view refers to J. Sprute: Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik. Göt‑
tingen 1982, pp. 80 ff. Cf. F. Sol msen: “Aristotelian Tradition…”, p. 39.
30 See J. Łu kasiewicz: Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic. 
Oxford 1972 (21957), pp. 3, 10; A r is toteles: Analytica Priora. Buch II, übersetzt von N. St ro ‑
bach, M. Mal i n k, erläutert von N. St robach. Berlin–Boston 2015, pp. 95 f.
31 This example may have been inspired by the circumstances of the third Sacred War (356–
346 bc) fought between the Phocians and the Thebans over the control of Delphi, as well as De‑
mosthenes’ diplomatic mission to Thebes, whereby he managed to convince the Thebans to join 
forces with Athens against Philip of Macedon in 339 bc. See Dem. 22, 168–179; Plut. Dem. 18; 
Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics. Ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford 1957, ad loc. (p. 488). Cf. Quint. 
Inst. 9, 3, 55; W. Jaeger: Demosthenes. Der Staatsmann und sein Werden. Berlin 21963, pp. 183 f; 
C.W. Wooten: Cicero’s Philippics and Their Demosthenic Model. The Rhetoric of Crisis. Chapel 
Hill – London 1983, pp. 6, 8 f. I would like to thank Prof. J. Kucha r sk i  for suggesting to me the 
possible historical context of that passage.
32 Where A = (ἄκρον) ‘the extreme [statement]’ – ‘[a thing] is evil’ (Oberbegriff ); B = (μέσον) 
‘the middle’ – ‘to fight against neighbors’ (Mittelbegriff ); Γ = (τρίτον) ‘the third’ – ‘war between 
the Athenians and the Thebans’ (Unterbegriff ); Δ = (ὅμοιον) ‘the similar’ – ‘war between the The‑
bans and the Phocians’ (das Ähnliche). Cf. S. Schwei n f u r th  ‑Wal la: Studien zu den rhetorischen 




the Barbara ‑1 syllogism with a context (no 1 above) which enables us to perform 
the induction33.
Although Aristotle himself, as was noted (n. 25 above), speaks only of arguing 
from part to part, it is implied in his reasoning that a kind of mediated generaliza‑
tion is involved in the process34. The ‘first part’, as W.L. Benoit points out, is the 
‘premise’ that it was evil when the Thebans fought the Phocians, their neighbors. 
The ‘second part’ is the ‘conclusion’ we arrive at, that it would be wrong for the 
Athenians to fight their Theban neighbors. What connects them is a whole: ‘it is 
evil to fight neighbors’35. The exemplum in its narrowest sense (παράδειγμα par 
excellence), according to Aristotle, is Δ = ‘war between the Thebans and the Pho‑
cians’ (ὅτι δὲ τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχει, διὰ τοῦ Δ δειχθήσεται)36. B (‘to fight against 
neighbors’) is the predicate, the intermediate action (‘middle’, μέσον) through 
which one is able to ascribe Γ and Δ to the same general class (γένος). An orator 
who is inventing an exemplum, therefore, needs to decide whether the action he 
is about to discuss (Γ) is right or wrong or, alternatively, whether something that 
has already been done was just or unjust (Α, in the present case ‘[a thing] is evil/
wrong’). Let us call it a ‘value judgement’. Then an example of a similar action, in 
that it belongs to the same general class (B), from the past (Δ) ought to be presen‑ 
ted. Having gathered all the particulars, the speaker will possess a premise (no 1 
above, Δ = A) leading to a conclusion (no 2, Γ = A) based upon a predicate (B). 
Obviously, whether an action is/was actually good or wrong is irrelevant to him 
as he is making a rhetorical case and his objectives depend on the point of view.
As the discussion of the paradigm in the Prior Analytics involves details of 
its mechanics but lacks those of the rhetorical context, we may now return to the 
example from the Rhetoric where we are facing the opposite situation. The audi‑
ence is aware that Dionysius asks for a bodyguard, but it remains unclear to what 
purpose he does that. The speaker wants to prove that he is aiming at tyranny. 
There were those before him, Pisistratus and Theagenes of Megara in particular, 
who having obtained a bodyguard made themselves tyrants37. This fact is known 
33 On the basis of the words Παράδειγμα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅταν τῷ μέσῳ τὸ ἄκρον ὑπάρχον δειχθῇ διὰ 
τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ τρίτῳ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέσον τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνώριμον εἶναι ὑπάρχον 
N. St robach (Hrsg.): Aristoteles. Analytica Priora…, p. 517 builds a following pattern (where a = 
‘is predicated of’ [“zukommt”]): 1. AaD, 2. AaB, 3. BaC, 4. AaC. Nos 2–4 correspond exactly to 
Barbara ‑1.
34 See W.L. Benoit: “On Aristotle’s Example”. Philosophy & Rhetoric 20, 4 (1987), pp. 261–
267. Cf. P. von Moos: “Das argumentative Exemplum…”, pp. 61 f; W.M.A. G r imald i: Aristotle, 
Rhetoric I…, loc. cit.: “A moment’s reflection will show that one can not  u se example w ithout 
impl ic i t ly  or  expl ic i t ly  ma k i ng a  rea l  i nduct ion in order to apprehend the general class 
under which the particulars fall and therefore resemble one other” (emphasis added).
35 See W.L. Benoit: “On Aristotle’s Example…”, p. 263.
36 Cf. the emphasized sentence in Arist. Rh. 1357b (n. 22 above).
37 On Pisistratus’ successful deceit see Hdt. 1, 59, 4–6 with A Commentary on Herodotus Books 
I–IV. Eds. O. Mu r ray, A. Moreno. Oxford 2007, ad loc. (p. 122 [D. Asher i]); Plut. Sol. 30, 2 f. 
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to the hearers. All such men become examples of those who acted in a similar way 
as Dionysius has (παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου), whose intentions, 
however, are still unknown (ὃν οὐκ ἴσασίν πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ)38. A pattern ana‑
logical to the one described above may be achieved: 1) Δ = A and Δ = B (it is a fact 
that they became tyrants after having asked for and obtained a bodyguard), there‑
fore 3) all B equal A (whoever asks for a bodyguard, aims at tyranny); 4) Γ = B 
which eventually leads to 5) Γ = A. Here the fact that Pisistratus and Theagenes 
of Megara succeeded in establishing tyranny because they asked for a bodyguard 
constitutes a premise (‘first part’) and the conclusion (‘second part’) is that Dio‑
nysius too aims at tyranny. One will quickly notice, however, that the two cases 
differ in one crucial respect, namely the question the speaker is addressing. In the 
former, he is assessing whether an action should be considered right or wrong, and 
in the latter he is stating a fact (does or does not Dionysius aim at tyranny?). The 
categorization of various cases into different staseis itself is post ‑Aristotelian, but 
its application will help to solve the difficulty. The orator arguing that it is wrong 
for the Athenians to fight against the Thebans faces the status iuridicialis (resp. 
qualitatis: “an iure fecerit/facturus sit”); the one who wants to prove that Diony‑
sius is aiming at tyranny – status coniecturalis (“an fecerit/faciat”). Cicero (Inv. 2, 
19) will later recommend exempla and similes as useful tools in the conjectural 
kind of cases, especially in establishing the motif39.
To sum up: according to Aristotle, the exemplum as a means of persuasion con‑
sists of several items which are interrelated on the principle of analogy. What he 
calls ‘the third’ is that which constitutes the case under discussion (Γ). A speaker 
needs first to establish ‘the extreme’ (Α), i.e. a value judgement or a statement of 
fact depending on the status causae. Then, he has to produce an event from the 
past (‘the similar’ or the paradigm proper, Δ) that would enable him to ascribe Γ to 
Α. The two occurrences must belong to the same ‘general class’ (γένος) which is 
attainable through the predicate (‘the middle’), an intermediate action both of them 
share. The process runs from the premise connecting Δ to Α and Β respectively, 
through the mediating generalization (the implied ‘whole’: ‘whoever/whatever Α, 
Β’) to a conclusion proving that Α holds for (is predicated of) Γ. 
Cf. Polyaen. 1, 21, 3. On Theagenes of Megara see, e.g., the literature cited by W.M.A. G r i mald i: 
Aristotle, Rhetoric I…, ad 57b30 (p. 70).
38 Hence the following is given (cf. n. 32): A = ‘to aim at tyranny’; B = ‘to ask for a bodyguard’; 
Γ = ‘Dionysius asks for a bodyguard’; Δ = ‘Pisistratus and Theagenes made themselves tyrants after 
having obtained a bodyguard’.
39 On the stasis theory of Hermagoras in general see G.M.A. Grube: The Greek and Roman 
Critics. London 1965, pp. 142 ff; H. Lausberg: Handbuch…, §§ 150–197 (pp. 89–108), on its influ‑
ence upon the Romans cf. e.g. G. Calbol i: “La retorica preciceroniana e la politica a Roma”. In: 
Éloquence et rhétorique chez Cicéron. Éd. W. Ludwig. Vandœuvres–Genève 1982, p. 66. F. Sol m‑
sen: “Aristotelian Tradition…”, pp. 177 with n. 85, 180 f argues that Aristotle may have to a certain 
degree inspired the system. The standard work on staseis is L. Calbol i  Montef usco: La dottrina 




The Adjustment of the Paradigm Theory
In approaching what the later rhetoricians had written on the subject of exem‑
plum as a means of persuasion and in examining the ways in which Cicero availed 
himself of the device, one needs to bear in mind that they were presumably ac‑
quainted with either Aristotle’s handling of it or with some more accessible treat‑
ment of his theory. Whatever the case, even if the pattern turns out applicable to the 
rhetorical practice, it seems to be terminologically deficient by modern standards, 
especially when it comes to “that which constitutes the case under discussion” on 
the one hand and “the event referred to during a speech” on the other. K. Demoen, 
in constructing his own paradigm for the analysis of paradigms, has determined 
these as illustrandum and illustrans respectively40. In general terms, then, the nar‑
rowly conceived exemplum is “an appeal to a similar or illustrative incident (the 
illustrans) which is not intrinsically connected with the matter under discussion 
(the illustrandum)”. Additionally, the scholar made use of the idea of an Ernstbe‑
deutung – ‘a semantic intention within the context’ as opposed to the Eigenbedeu‑
tung – ‘a meaning in itself’ of the illustrans, which he has found in and adopted 
from the work of H. Lausberg41. The former is, roughly, what we have recognized 
in Aristotle as the implied whole mediating the relation between the particulars 
(‘parts’), and what Quintilian will later specify succinctly as “id quod intenderis”42. 
Seen in the light of the present terminological basis, the example from Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric can be interpreted as follows: the speaker, addressing an audience aware 
of Dionysius’ actions (illustrandum), but unaware of his intentions, by bringing 
forth the cases of Pisistratus and Theagenes of Megara (illustrantia) means that 
everyone who asks for a bodyguard aims at tyranny (Ernstbedeutung). The events 
that he refers to could have had quite different overtones (their respective Eigenbe‑
deutungen) outside of this particular rhetorical context. 
This is still only a hypothetical argumentation but, insofar as we can rely on 
C. Iulius Victor, a rhetorician of the 4th century ad, the very ‘Dionysius paradigm’, 
40 See K. Demoen: “A Paradigm for the Analysis of Paradigms…”, p. 126. He adopted these 
useful terms from B.J. P r ice: Paradeigma and exemplum…, p. 219 who, in turn, as K. Demoen 
stresses, followed H. Fr i i s  Johansen whose study (General Reflection in Tragic Rhesis: A Study 
of Form. [Diss.] Copenhagen 1959) is, as the title betrays [non vidi], primarily devoted to Greek 
tragedy.
41 See K. Demoen: “A Paradigm for the Analysis of Paradigms…”, p. 127.
42 See H. Lausberg: Handbuch…, § 421 (pp. 231 f): “Das exemplum […] zeigt eine Doppels‑
chichtigkeit der semantischen voluntas […]: in der ersten Schicht wird die […] Eigenbedeutung des 
exemplum ‑Inhaltes gemeint […]. Aber die semantische Intention (Quint. 5.11.6 id quod intenderis 
[…]) des Sprechers geht über diese sich abgeschlossene normale Eigenbedeutung des exemplum hi‑
naus: das exemplum wird als Träger einer gültig gemeinten Ernstbedeutung in den Dienst der causa 
genommen: d ie  Eigenbedeut u ng des  exemplu m is t  e i n  spiele r i sches Mit t el  z u r  Er‑
re ichu ng des  Zieles  de r  Er ns tbedeut u ng”. Cf. OLD, s.v. “intendo” 9, 10c, 11d, 12.
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as mentioned above, was employed at Rome by ‘C. Fannius’ towards the end of 
the 2nd century bc. An attempt at interpreting these passages in accordance with the 
suggested patterns would therefore be worthwhile. A brief sketch of the historical 
background will suffice for our purposes. By the end of the 120s C. Gracchus as 
a tribune of the plebs proposed a series of bills aimed at improving the well ‑being 
of the lower strata of the Roman people and one somehow related to granting 
citizenship to the Latins and Latin rights to the Italians. As was the case with his 
brother, he too faced rigid opposition from a majority of the ruling class. Among 
those was his former supporter, C. Fannius, elected as consul for the year 12243. No 
matter what the real objectives of the brothers Gracchi were, the nobiles perceived 
their activity as subversive and dangerous to the state44. The killing of Tiberius 
was thus depicted along the lines of a tyrannicide45. The fragments of the ora‑
tion incertae sedis quoted above (cf. n. 23), therefore, reflect the aristocratic sen‑
timents toward a revolutionary, though successful politician. On whatever occa‑
sion ‘C. Fannius’ spoke those words, he wanted to make his audience believe that 
C. Gracchus by being munificent was in fact aiming at autocracy46. His rhetorical 
goal, therefore, was a statement of the following fact: ‘whoever bribes the people 
with gifts, aims at tyranny’ (“qui cives largitione corrumpit, dominationem petit” 
[~ fr. 6 f], B = A) leading to the conclusion expressed in the apodosis of fr. 7: “quid 
est, quod non idem Gracchum adfectare credatis, quem eadem quae illos facere 
43 See Plut. CG. 8; Schol. Bob. p. 93 Hi ldebrandt  = 132 St angl; J. Ca rcopi no: Autour des 
Gracques. Études critiques. Paris 1928, pp. 235–244; C. Meie r: Res publica amissa. Eine Studie zu 
Verfassung und Geschichte der späten römischen Republik. Frankfurt 1980, pp. 131–134; A. Lintott: 
“Political History, 146–95 B.C.”. In: The Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. 9: The Last Age of the 
Roman Republic, 146–43 B.C. Eds. J.A. Crook, A. Li ntot t, E. Rawson. Cambridge 22006, pp. 
78 f, 83 f. That was also the year of C. Gracchus’ second tribunate (MRR. 1.517).
44 See, e.g., Cic. Off. 1, 109 with A.R. Dyck: A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis. Ann Arbor 
1996, ad loc. (p. 278) for more references; H. Gals t e re r: Herrschaft und Verwaltung im republika‑
nischen Italien. München 1976, pp. 174 f. Cf. Cic. Brut. 99 fin. (2ORF, p. 143): “alii [scil. aiebant] 
multos nobiles, quod quisque potuisset, in illam orationem [scil. De sociis et nomine Latino] contu‑
lisse” and a brief discussion of that passage in D. Stock ton: The Gracchi…, p. 191. The Gracchi 
were not opposed by the senate as such or all the nobiles, but by certain factiones from the start 
and, in the case of C. Gracchus, by those (including his former supporters) who disapproved of his 
legislation. See R.J. Rowland, Jr.: “The Development of Opposition to C. Gracchus”. Phoenix 23, 
4 (1969), pp. 372–379.
45 See Plut. TG. 19, 3 and T.P. Wiseman: Remembering the Roman People. Essays on Late‑
 ‑Republican Politics and Literature. Oxford 2009, pp. 177–187 who discusses the killing of Ti‑
berius in detail. Cf. M.E. Cla rk, J.E. Ruebel: “Philosophy and Rhetoric in Cicero’s Pro Milone”. 
RhM 128, 1 (1985), pp. 59, n. 7; 69 f, n. 35. On the subject in general see T.R. Du n k le: “The Greek 
Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic”. TAPA 98 (1967), pp. 151–171.
46 See Vell. 2, 6, 2: “qui [scil. C. Gracchus] cum summa quiete animi civitatis princeps esse 
posset, vel vindicandae fraternae mortis gratia vel praemu n iand ae rega l i s  potent iae  eiusdem 
exempli tribunatum ingressus, longe maiora e t  ac r iora  pe tens dabat civitatem omnibus Itali‑
cis […]”. Cf. Plut. CG. 14, 3 fin.: ἐκ τούτου πάλιν εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον ἀπελθόντες ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ 




videtis?”. In order to attain the desired end, he needed first to present the actions 
of C. Gracchus in this light (Γ = ‘he bribes the people, etc.’), and next to introduce 
a historical parallel: Dionysius, Pisistratus, and Phalaris obtained control over the 
state by doing so (Δ). This latter action by itself (Eigenbedeutung) means only that 
as a result of their munificence, they were able to make themselves autocrats, but 
‘C. Fannius’ intended it to signify that it is the aim of one seducing the people to 
gain supreme power (Ernstbedeutung). On the strictly analytical level, the premise 
(‘first part’), where ‘the extreme’ is identical with that of the example from Aris‑
totle’s Rhetoric (‘to aim at tyranny’), relies on the paradigm proper (Δ = A), and 
through the mediating generalization (‘a whole’, or ‘the predicate’, every B = A) it 
leads to an inevitable conclusion (‘second part’) that C. Gracchus aims at tyranny 
when he bribes the people (Γ = A). On the rhetorical level, on the other hand, the 
speaker first shapes the meaning of what Dionysius and the others had done (the 
particular Eigenbedeutungen become his Ernstbedeutung), turning it into the illus‑
trans (fr. 7: “si Phalaridi et Pisistrato […] una res maxime, largitio, dominationem 
comparavit”); then, he recognizes the action of largiri as “the common denomina‑
tor” (‘the middle’ which renders them as belonging to the same ‘general class’) of 
both the illustrans and the illustrandum. This enables him to juxtapose Gracchus 
with his infamous predecessors through the predicate (B = A as stated above).
The question of whether or not the anti ‑Gracchan speaker relied directly on Ar‑
istotle must remain unanswered due to the scarcity of the fragments and the lack of 
any external evidence. It seems plausible, however, that he might have had access 
to some second ‑hand material derived from the Rhetoric as the example enjoyed 
a certain recognition among the later Roman rhetoricians.47 As regards Phalaris, 
the tyrant of Akragas, who is absent from “the source”, he might have been im‑
plied therein (καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσους ἴσασι) and became later on a part of the catalogue.48 
What seems surprising is that ‘C. Fannius’ employed neither more contemporary 
Greek examples, e.g. those of Agathocles or Nabis49, nor any Roman parallel50. 
This might have resulted from the fact that Pisistratus and the others, unlike the 
two autocrats mentioned above, had already been established figures in rhetorical 
tradition, whereas the exempla of the Romans who craved tyranny were still in the 
47 See Quint. Inst. 5, 11, 8 quoted in n. 22 above, and Iul. Victor (RLM, p. 413 Halm quoted 
above and p. 399 to be quoted shortly [cf. P. von Moos: “Das argumentative Exemplum…”, p. 72, 
n. 29]).
48 See, e.g., Cic. Verr. 5, 145 cited by Quint. Inst. 8, 6, 72; Cic. Att. 7, 20, 2, N.D. 3, 82. On 
Phalaris in general see e.g. the sources and literature listed by A. Lazza re t t i: M. Tulli Ciceronis, 
In C. Verrem actionis secundae Liber quartus (De signis). Commento storico e archeologico. Pisa 
2006, ad Cic. Verr. 4, 73 (pp. 225 f).
49 As was suggested by J. ‑L. Fe r ra r y: “A propos de deux fragments…”, p. 56.
50 The negative exempla of Sp. Cassius (Cic. Rep. 2, 60; Liv. 2, 41; D.H. 8, 69–80, etc.), 
Sp. Maelius (e.g. Cic. Mil. 72; Liv. 4, 13–15), and M. Manlius (Liv. 5, 47, 4–9; Plut. Cam. 27, 4–6) 
would be particularly appropriate. See on these figures as exempla P. Pan it schek: “Sp. Cassius, 
Sp. Maelius, M. Manlius…”, passim.
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making during the late Republic51. At any rate, C. Gracchus’ adversary had all the 
means he could have dreamt of at his disposal, including a political background 
easily associated with tyranny and a ready exemplum matching his goal.
This, finally, brings up the question: what constitutes an exemplum? To an‑
swer it, one has to make use of the modern terminology – it will not do to resort 
to Aristotle’s variables. It follows from the previous discussion that to speak of 
an exemplum as a means of persuasion, and not in the broader sense adumbrated 
at the outset, we need to discern at least three of its essential elements: the illus‑
trans, the illustrandum, and the predicate. The latter is, in fact, what underlies this 
rhetorical device, for without it the speaker is unable to build a proper historical 
parallel. In order to formulate a premise and a conclusion, consisting of either 
a value judgement or a statement of fact, as outlined above, he will require a set of 
actions. A successful exemplum, moreover, is impossible if the actions do not be‑
long to the same general class52. As a result, all the references to historical figures 
which cannot be viewed as forming an analogy between the predicates demand an 
alternative approach. This is an issue both ancient and modern scholarship tends to 
oversimplify precisely because of the lack of more accurate distinctions53. We have 
already mentioned that Quintilian brings forth the Aristotelian example concerning 
the tyrants when dealing with the subject of deliberations about the future. Else‑
where, he quotes from Cicero (ref’s in n. 47) the following sentence: “versabatur 
in Sicilia longo intervallo non alter Dionysius ille nec Phalaris […], sed quoddam 
novum monstrum ex vetere illa inmanitate, quae in isdem versata locis dicitur” as 
an instance of a hyperbole per translationem allata. The entire passage, of course, 
is understood best against this precise rhetorical background of the Institutio ora‑
toria, but what are we to make of Dionysius and Phalaris by themselves? They are 
still referred to by the speaker as people from the past, but this time none of their 
action is meant. Let us postpone the inquiry into their case in the fifth Verrine until 
we supplement our theoretical basis accordingly.
K. Demoen copes with the difficulty by distinguishing various ways in which 
an exemplum is inserted into context54. He forms a list of elements a paradigm 
51 See J. ‑L. Fe r ra r y: “A propos de deux fragments…”, loc. cit. and P. Pan it schek: “Sp. Cas‑
sius, Sp. Maelius, M. Manlius…,” pp. 232–245 respectively.
52 Cf. Cic. Inv. 1, 82: “Cum autem pro conparabili aliquid inducetur, quoniam id per similitu‑
dinem maxime tractatur, in reprehendendo convenient simile id negare esse, quod conferetur, ei, 
quicum conferetur. […] deinde, quid res cum re differat, demonstrabimus”.
53 P. von Moos: “Das argumentative Exemplum…”, p. 62 grasps the essence of the problem 
when he writes: “Die doppelte, weite und enge Bedeutung von paradeigma, die Quintilian später 
ausdrücklich für das lateinische Äquivalent exemplum übernimmt, lässt sich daraus erklären, dass 
das historische Beispiel in der antiken Rhetorik als Beschreibungsmodell für alle Vergleichsargu‑
mente diente und so etwas wie das Vergleichsargument per antonomasian darstellte”.
54 The following overview is based on K. Demoen: “A Paradigm for the Analysis of Para‑





potentially includes: (a) illustrans, (b) illustrandum, (c) “Ernstbedeutung or the 
conclusion drawn from it”, (d) linking term or formula. Then he introduces four 
types of the exemplum based on the presence or absence (explicit or implicit) of 
the said elements: 1) the full exemplum, 2) the minimal exemplum (abd), 3) the 
metaphorical exemplum (b = a, or a), and 4) the exemplum without insertion (b). 
According to this, the argument advanced by ‘C. Fannius’, for instance, would fall 
into the category ‘full exemplum’, because all the elements, including the Ernst‑
bedeutung, are stated explicitly. And, to my view, the scheme is useful as long 
as we are able to detect a semantic intention on the part of the speaker in any 
of the types 2 and 3. But a good deal of such inquiry will turn out to be a mere 
guesswork, if only due to the fact that our knowledge of the actions undertaken by 
some of the people referred to in ancient oratory is at best limited. The rhetorical 
goal seems to make a better criterion. We have observed that with regard to the 
exemplum proper, it is strictly persuasive: an orator wants to prove something and, 
more precisely, something about an action (it was just/unjust; it took/did not take 
place, etc.). Since K. Demoen called his 3rd type ‘the metaphorical exemplum’, 
in which “[t]he Ernstbedeutung is merely implied” and which “takes the shape of 
a Vossian antonomasia”, i.e. substitution of a name55, it would perhaps be more 
justified to specify such reference to the past simply as antonomasia. In this case, 
the illustrans will be either introduced in the vocative or accompanied by a pro‑
noun, especially demonstrative (ille, iste, etc.) and possessive (meus, noster), or by 
a qualifying adjective, such as novus56. This will serve to additionally characterize 
the illustrandum, on the one hand, and to avoid the confusion as to whether the 
actual mythological or historical character or a person taking part in the trial is the 
speaker’s main focus, on the other. 
55 If a regular antonomasia is a substitution of a proper name by a descriptive formula (com‑
mune pro proprio, e.g. “divum pater atque hominum rex” [Verg. A. 1, 65 quoted by Quint. Inst. 
8, 6, 29] for Jupiter, or “Romanae eloquentiae princeps” [ibid. § 30] for Cicero), then the Vossian 
(since ca 1643 ad) counterpart is its inversion, a substitution of a set of characteristics by a proper 
name (proprium pro communi) which embodies those characteristics according to the tradition. See 
on the subject in general A.D. Leeman: Orationis ratio…, p. 38, and for quotation from Vossius: 
H. Lausberg: Handbuch…, § 581 (pp. 301 f). As one of the instances of antonomasia, notably, 
R. Vol k man n: Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht. Hildesheim–
Zürich–New York 1987 (2Leipzig 1885), p. 425 cites Cic. Prov. Cons. 9: “an vero in Syria diutius est 
illa Semiramis retinenda?”. Cf. the comment of P. von Moos quoted in n. 53 above.
56 See H. Lausberg: Handbuch…, loc. cit.; K. Demoen: “A Paradigm for the Analysis of 
Paradigms…”, p. 146. Cf. the example quoted at the end of the previous note and the comment of 
Cicero’s De Provinciis Consularibus… . Ed. L. G r i l lo, ad loc. (p. 128): “By pronominatio […] 
Cicero […] sarcastically lays out the main strands of his invective against Gabinius as effeminate, 
cruel, ambitious and incompetent”.
CEEOL copyright 2021
CEEOL copyright 2021
29References to Historical Figures as a Means of Persuasion…
Applying the Theory to Cicero’s Rhetorical Practice
Two brief examples should help us make this distinction clear. In the thirteenth 
Philippic Cicero reproaches Antony’s own perception of his siege of Mutina in the 
following way (13, 25): “Veneficam audes appellare eum virum, qui tuis veneficiis 
remedia invenit? quem ita obsides, nove Hannibal , […] ut te ipse obsideas 
neque te istinc, si cupias, possis explicare. Recesseris, undique omnes insequentur; 
manseris haerebis”. Antony’s policy at the time rested on arousing indignation to‑
wards those responsible for Caesar’s death. In answer to his calling D. Brutus the 
“poisoner”, Cicero dubbed him the “new Hannibal”. Here, however, we need not 
abandon the exemplary line of interpretation in that the speaker’s semantic inten‑
tion lies with comparing the military undertakings at Mutina with Hannibal’s siege 
of Saguntum57. His Ernstbedeutung, to put it succinctly, is that the obvious result 
of Antony’s conduct must be a war against Rome, which he is bound to lose. By 
saying nove Hannibal, then, Cicero does not aim at bringing together the two men 
as such, but at juxtaposing their particular actions. A few passages earlier, when 
dealing with the same letter Antony has sent Hirtius and Octavian, Cicero com‑
ments on his being pleased by the death of C. Trebonius, who was involved in the 
assassination of Caesar. The speaker was at loss of words in expressing his outrage 
(Phil. 13, 22 fin.): “o  Spa r t ace ! quem enim te potius appellem, cuius propter 
nefanda scelera tolerabilis fuisse videtur Catilina?”. This reference to Spartacus 
does not meet the criteria of the exemplum proper described above, for it is diffi‑
cult to associate any episode of the slave upheaval with what befell Trebonius. The 
Thracian gladiator stands for a villain and a criminal in general, and the speaker 
links him with Antony58. O Spartace, therefore, counts as (Vossian) antonomasia 
because the proper name is a substitute for the traits with which the tradition fur‑
nished “Spartacus”.
57 See H. van de r  Blom: Cicero’s Role Models…, pp. 109–111 (here at p. 110), 113 f. Cf. 
H. Fr isch: Cicero’s Fight for the Republic. The Historical Background of Cicero’s Philippics. Co‑
penhagen 1946, p. 255; A. Li ntot t: Cicero as Evidence. A Historian’s Companion. Oxford 2008, 
pp. 389 f. On Hannibal as exemplum in Cicero’s speeches see also F. Bücher: Verargumentierte 
Geschichte…, pp. 218–220.
58 Cicero’s rhetorical strategy of depicting Antony (and his brother) as either gladiator in gener‑
al or as Spartacus in particular was recently discussed by D. S łapek: “Lucius Antonius – gladiator 
Asiaticus. Gladiatorial Episode Seen Through the Eyes of M. Tullius Cicero”. In: Marcus Antonius. 
History and Tradition. Eds. I. Łuć, D. S łapek. Lublin 2016, pp. 165–183 and A. Dziuba: “«The 
Effeminate Spartacus». The Rhetoric Description of Marc Antony in Cicero’s Philippics”. In: Mar‑
cus Antonius… . Eds. I. Łuć, D. S łapek pp. 185–195. Cf. my review of this volume in Eos 104, 
1 (2017), esp. at pp. 181 f. Here, I confine myself only to touching upon the subject, for I explore 
it more thoroughly in D. P ie r zak: “Spartacus as a Point of Reference in Cicero’s Orations”. In: 




Now, we may turn our attention back to Verr. 5, 145 where C. Verres is pre‑
sented as worse than anything or anyone (“[…] non alter Dionysius ille nec Pha‑
laris [scil. in Sicilia versabatur]”) the province had ever experienced. Within the 
framework of an elaborate metaphor, the tyrants are introduced in the form of an 
antonomasia and serve to inform the recipient that the governor who is standing 
trial has overshadowed even their cruelty. None of their actions, as already men‑
tioned, are meant, so the historical context of the reference would be difficult to 
establish for us and for Cicero’s audience alike. It follows that as from the ana‑
lytical viewpoint the constituting element of the exemplum is its predicate, so on 
the rhetorical level it requires “a narrative possessing a context”59. Without it, the 
speaker cannot hope to advance any logical argument. Such reference to the past 
should be therefore viewed as part of his ethical argumentation, designed, at least 
theoretically, to either denigrate or praise the character of a person involved in 
the case under discussion. Since the rhetorical procedure of referring to historical 
figures varies depending on the shape it takes, whether of an exemplum or an an‑
tonomasia, I would opt to introduce more general expressions to describe a person 
to whom someone is compared and the one the speaker aims at characterizing. The 
former I would call ‘a point of reference’ and the latter ‘a designate’, so that the 
illustrans and the illustrandum be reserved for the exemplum proper. 
We have observed, following P. von Moos (n. 53 above), that the difficulties in 
defining exemplum result from the freedom the ancient rhetoricians allowed them‑
selves when discussing it. The meaning of the word exemplum, it would seem, 
ranged from a broadly conceived reference to the past, including e.g. legal pre‑ 
cedents, to a rendition of the Aristotelian παράδειγμα in the sense of a historical 
parallel based on analogy and employed as a means of persuasion. Some of their 
applications, both in theory and practice, must have overlapped, and the ancients 
apparently lumped together the past events rooted in the tradition into a still more 
general repertoire of the loci communes. That is the case with C. Iulius Victor, who 
quotes the example from the Rhetoric among the loci circa rem60, but such perspec‑
tive goes back as far as Cicero himself61. As C.P. Craig points out, “in De Orat. 2, 
59 I have adopted this notion from U. Rei n ha rdt: Mythologische Beispiele in der Neuen 
Komödie (Menander, Plautus, Terenz). Vol. 1. (Diss.) Mainz 1974, p. 10, for whom it became a fac‑
tor differentiating the mythological exemplum from a common metonymy (D. P ie r zak: “Greek 
Myth in Cicero’s Orations”. Eos 103, 1 (2016), p. 151 [a summary of my PhD thesis]). In studying the 
narrowly conceived historical exempla, however, it seems no less applicable as long as one replaces 
“metonymy” with “antonomasia”. 
60 See Iul. Victor 4, 3 (RLM, p. 399 Halm): “Omne enim, quod in quaestionem venit, habet 
aliquid, cui comparetur, cum quo conferatur, quia est ei aliquid simile […]. Et ducetur aut ab exem‑
plo aut a parabola aut a fabula aut ab imagine. Ab exemplo, sicut hoc est: s i  cus todes cor por is 
Dionysio deder i t i s, etc.”.
61 In the De or. 2, 168–172 as examples of loci a simili, a contrario, etc. he brings forth a good 
number of historical characters. [Cicero] Ad C. Herennium… . Ed. H. Caplan, p. 237, n. e lists 
De or. 2, 169 as one of the passages illustrating the place of exemplum “in Cicero’s theory of argu‑
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162–173 and in Cicero’s Topica […] loci are no longer content ‑specific, but have 
become the sedes argumentorum (Top. 8) in the sense of formal patterns”62. It fol‑
lows, then, that the references to the past in general formed part of the potential 
arguments available for a speaker, but needed not be used as artificial proofs. Any 
speaker would be thus allowed to proceed in the following way: first, either pick 
an already existing point of reference (the so ‑called stock exempla63) from among 
the sedes argumentorum (τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενημένα) or invent one (τὸ 
αὐτὸν ποιεῖν) by himself. Then he would have to determine his goal as either 
strictly persuasive or otherwise. In the former case, he could shape the reference 
to the past, depending on the circumstances, into either an exemplum proper or an 
antonomasia.
Cicero must have had this broader application in mind when he recommended 
to orators the mastering of as many exempla as possible64, which is most apparent 
from his practice. Although there are some hints in his writings, especially in the 
De officiis, as to how a person should live up to his or her family and/or personal 
exempla (hence in a wider sense of the word)65, their use will be determined more 
by the political than the rhetorical context. In studying the speeches as illustrating 
his art of persuasion, however, one ought to rely on more precise precepts. As was 
observed by C.P. Craig, who comments on the three possible approaches to the 
Ciceronian oratory offered by C.J. Classen, the kind of study with which we are 
concerned is impossible when detached from the political background of a given 
speech66. The unique situation of each of the orations being taken into account, 
mentation”. Cf. also the references quoted in n. 13 above where exempla count among the figures 
of thought.
62 See C.P. Cra ig: Form as Argument in Cicero’s Speeches. A Study of Dilemma. Atlanta 1993, 
p. 2, n. 3. Cf. Aristoteles. Rhetorik… . Hrsg. C. Rapp, ad 1402b12–1402b20 (p. 794 f); Cicero’s 
Topica. Ed. T. Rei n ha rdt. Oxford 2003, passim. 
63 On the ‘stock exempla’ see, e.g., H. van de r  Blom: Cicero’s Role Models…, pp. 107–117. 
On the collections of exempla and their function outside of rhetoric cf. H.W. Lit ch f ield: “National 
Exempla Virtutis in Roman Literature”. HSCPh 25 (1914), pp. 1–71.
64 See Cic. De or. 1, 18 quoted (with literature) in n. 18 above; Orat. 120 fin.: “Com memora ‑
t io  autem ant iqu it a t i s  exemplor u mque prola t io  summa cum delectatione et auctoritatem 
orationi adfert et fidem”; Part. Orat. 96 init.: “Uterque vero ad augendum habeat  exemplor u m 
aut recentium, quo notiora sint, aut veterum, quo plus auctoritatis habeant, copiam”. Cf. Quint. 
Inst. 12, 4, 1.
65 See Cic. Off. 1, 115–121; 2, 46 f and H. van de r  Blom: Cicero’s Role Models…, passim 
(pp. 83 f for theoretical precepts); R. Langlands: “Roman Exempla and Situation Ethics: Valerius 
Maximus and Cicero de Officiis”. JRS 101 (2011), pp. 100–122. Cf. Cicero’s De Provinciis Consu‑
laribus… . Ed. L. G r i l lo, ad § 27 (p. 176).
66 See C.P. Cra ig: Form as Argument…, pp. 3–8 on C.J. Classen: “Ciceros Kunst der Überre‑
dung.” In: Éloquence et rhétorique… . Éd. W. Ludwig, pp. 149 f. The three approaches, in short, 
are these: “1) We may examine each speech in terms of its unique situation […], 2) We may detail the 
extent to which Cicero’s practice corresponds with rhetorical theory […], 3) We may notice tactics 





therefore, we could examine “the extent to which Cicero’s practice corresponds 
with rhetorical theory”67 as described above. Every instance of a departure from 
what the handbooks advise would of course compel us to investigate the cause of 
the flexibility of an exemplum. 
The inquiry into the subject should begin with establishing whether or not 
a historical figure is referred to by the speaker as a means of persuasion, i.e. as 
a “vehicle” of either a logical (the exemplum proper) or an ethical (the antono‑
masia) argument. Then there would follow a detailed examination of the relations 
between the point of reference and the designate (and their relation to the predicate 
in the case of exemplum) based on both Aristotle’s analytical theory and Quintil‑
ian’s description of the degrees of similarity, for the discussion of which there is no 
space in the present paper. Next, the study would focus on the speaker’s rhetorical 
goal: is he aiming at portraying the character of the designate or at convincing the 
audience that certain action took/did not take place/was just/unjust, etc.? In the 
latter case, one would have to sketch a pattern consisting of the following items: 
a presupposed statement of fact or value judgement, a premise, a conclusion, and 
a predicate through which these can be ascribed to the same general class. Such 
a research methodology, to my view, would help us understand better the ways in 
which Cicero availed himself of the theoretical precepts, on the one hand, and in 
which the Romans adjusted historical figures to their own exemplary discourse, on 
the other. 
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